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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
The Effects of Comparable‐Case Guidance on Awards for
Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages: Evidence
from a Randomized Controlled Trial
Hillel J. Bavli* & Reagan Mozer**
Damage awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages are
notoriously unpredictable. Courts provide minimal, if any, guidance to
jurors determining these awards, and apply similarly minimal standards in
reviewing them. Lawmakers have enacted crude measures, such as
damage caps, aimed at curbing award unpredictability, while ignoring less
drastic alternatives that involve guiding jurors with information regarding
damage awards in comparable cases “comparable‐case guidance” or
“prior‐award information” . The primary objections to the latter approach
are based on the argument that, because prior‐award information uses
information regarding awards in distinct cases, it introduces the
possibility of biasing the award, or distorting the award size, even if prior‐
award information reduces the variability of awards. This paper responds
to these objections. It reports and interprets the results of a large
randomized controlled trial designed to test juror behavior in response to
prior‐award information and, specifically, to examine the effects of prior‐
award information on both variability and bias under a range of conditions
related to the foregoing objections. We conclude that there is strong
evidence that prior‐award information improves the “accuracy” of
awards—that it significantly reduces the variability of awards, and that
any introduction of bias, or distortion of award size, is minor relative to its
beneficial effect on variability. Furthermore, we conclude that there is
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evidence that jurors respond to prior‐award information as predicted in
recent literature, and in line with the “optimal” use of such information;
and that prior‐award information may cause jurors to approach award
determinations more thoughtfully or analytically.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In civil jury trials, juries are frequently asked to determine awards for
pain and suffering or punitive damages. But courts provide minimal, if any,
guidance to jurors determining these awards, and apply similarly minimal
standards in reviewing them. Consequently, these damage awards are
notoriously unpredictable.1 Courts have long expressed concern regarding
1.
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See Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 94 2d Cir. 2013 ; Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499‐503 2008 .
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this “virtually unbridled discretion” of juries,2 and the need to address this
“standardless, unguided exercise of discretion by the trier of fact,
reviewable . . . pursuant to no standard to guide the reviewing court
either.”3 Indeed, award unpredictability can cause failures in deterrence
and “corrective justice” objectives, harm to economies, high insurance
premiums, and loss of faith in the legal system.4
Lawmakers have enacted crude measures, such as damage caps, aimed
at curbing award unpredictability, while largely ignoring less drastic
alternatives that involve guiding jurors with information regarding
damage awards in comparable cases “comparable‐case guidance” or
“prior‐award information” .5 The primary objections to the latter
approach are based on the argument that, because prior‐award
information uses information regarding awards in distinct cases, it
introduces the possibility of biasing the award, or distorting the award
size, even if prior‐award information reduces the variability of awards.6
This article responds to these objections. In particular, it reports and
interprets the results of a large randomized controlled trial designed to
test juror behavior in response to prior‐award information and,
specifically, to examine the effects of prior‐award information on both
variability and bias under a range of conditions related to the foregoing
objections.
First, we examine whether prior‐award information reduces award
unpredictability. Some authors have argued that providing prior awards
that are themselves subject to arbitrariness may only exacerbate the

2.

Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 656 E.D.N.Y. 1997
quoting Leslie A. Rubin, Note, Confronting a New Obstacle to Reproductive

Choice: Encouraging the Development of RU‐486 Through Reform of
Products Liability Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 146 1990‐91 .
3.

Jutzi‐Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 7th Cir. 2001 ; see Hillel J.
Bavli, The Logic of Comparable‐Case Guidance in the Determination of
Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 5‐8
2017 hereinafter The Logic of CCG .

4.

See Payne, 711 F.3d at 94; Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain
and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 768‐69 1995 .

5.

See The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 8‐12.

6.

See, e.g., David A. Logan, Juries, Judges, and the Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U.
CIN. L. REV. 903, 943‐44 2015 “While such an approach would improve
predictability, it would only be as good as the quality of the methodology
for selecting which cases were factually similar enough to be included in the
range” ; The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 4‐5.
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problem of unpredictability.7 We address this argument by testing the
effect of prior‐award information on the dispersion of awards under
various conditions, including conditions related to the variability of the
prior awards. We then confirm whether prior‐award information has a
biasing effect on damage awards—that is, whether it causes a distortion of
award size—where the prior‐award information arises from cases that are
factually distinct from the present case. Then, to address the primary
objections to prior‐award information, we analyze the effect of prior‐
award information on variability relative to bias. Specifically, we develop a
framework for examining the effect of prior‐award information on
“accuracy,” which we define in terms of both variability and bias.
We conclude that there is strong evidence that prior‐award
information reduces the unpredictability of damage awards while also
introducing the possibility of biasing the awards. Most importantly, we
find strong evidence that prior‐award information improves the accuracy
of awards—that is, its beneficial effect on the dispersion of awards
overwhelmingly dominates any distortion of award size. This occurs even
when we design prior‐award information specifically to introduce bias. In
particular, we simulate conditions under which a court, for whatever
reason, fails to align the facts of the current case with the facts of prior
cases, thereby leading to an outlandish set of prior awards and ultimately
to substantial bias. Even under these conditions, however, we find that any
introduction of bias is minimal relative to the effects on variability.
Additionally, we examine a number of “behavioral” effects and find
evidence that jurors respond to prior‐award information as predicted in
recent literature and in line with the “optimal” use of such information. We
also find, based on our analysis of textual explanations provided by
participants, that prior‐award information may cause jurors to approach
award determinations more thoughtfully or analytically.
In Part II, we provide a brief overview of the problem—the
unpredictability of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages—
and describe a number of methods proposed to address it, including
methods involving prior‐award information. In Part III, we explain our
methodology. In Part IV, we report and interpret our results. In Part V, we
7.

See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing A Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for
Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF.
L. REV. 773, 792 1995 “If the system has been providing overly arbitrary
pain‐and‐suffering awards, and if we have no method for determining the
appropriate award in the first instance, why should we make prior awards
the cornerstone of future awards? By doing so, we may ensure that like cases
are treated alike in that all involve inappropriate damages awards.” .
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discuss limitations related to our methodology. Finally, in Part VI, we
discuss certain implications of our analysis and we conclude.
II. REDUCING VARIABILITY WITH PRIOR‐AWARD INFORMATION
Awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages are notoriously
unpredictable.8 The Supreme Court and lower courts have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of addressing the “inherent uncertainty of the
trial process”9 and the ruinous effects of such unpredictability.10 Courts
8.

See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
“Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 919‐24 1989 “Tort law’s
traditional methods of computing damages for personal injury and death are
under attack—and understandably so. Legal reformers have long argued
that present law, when combined with jury discretion, inflates damage
awards and creates problematic outcome variability. The open‐ended and
unpredictable nature of tort exposure has, in turn, threatened the liability
insurance system that funds most tort compensation.” ; Chase, supra note 4,
at 768‐69 citing studies ; Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments

About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase
examining the
Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 317 1998
“considerable variation in both juror and jury awards” ; David W. Leebron,

Final Moments: Damages For Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 256, 259 1989 “The data . . . suggest that tort awards for even this
relatively simple area pain and suffering prior to death vary significantly
and that neither the specific facts of the case nor differing theoretical views
of the functions of the awards can explain such variation.” ; Joni Hersch & W.
Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEG.
STUD. 1, 1‐10 2004
examining unpredictable awards for punitive
damages ; see also The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 1‐5 citing cases and
literature . But see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive
Damages: Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5 finding that the data does “not support
the unpredictability concern” ; Yun‐chien Chang et al., Pain and Suffering
Damages in Personal Injury Cases: An Empirical Study, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 199 2017 “ P ain and suffering damages in Taiwan are to a large
extent statistically and legally predictable.” . See generally Neil Vidmar &
Mirya Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of Jury
Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit, 43
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 855 2010 .
9.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500‐01 2008
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 626 Ala. 1994 .

quoting BMW of

10.

Id. at 499 “The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of
punitive awards”; “ t hus, a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its
409
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and commentators have proposed and implemented various methods of
addressing the unpredictability of awards for pain and suffering and
punitive damages, but none has prevailed as both adequate and
appropriate.

A. Current Methods and Proposals
First, courts currently use the procedures of additur and remittitur—
whereby a court that finds an award to be inadequate or excessive may
order a new trial if the litigant harmed by the procedure does not agree to
an increase additur or a reduction remittitur of the award.11 But these
devices are generally inadequate as tools for addressing variability. They

severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or
another. And when the bad man’s counterparts turn up from time to time,
the penalty scheme they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability
of suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage.” citing Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 1897 ;
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 1996 “Elementary notions
of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose” ;
Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 94 2d Cir. 2013 “Apart from impairing the
fairness, predictability and proportionality of the legal system, judgments
awarding unreasonable amounts as damages impose harmful, burdensome
costs on society.” ; Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 656
E.D.N.Y. 1997 commenting on the “virtually unbridled discretion” of juries
in deciding awards for pain and suffering ; Chase, supra note 4, at 768‐69
“Variability is a problem primarily because it undermines the legal system’s
claim that like cases will be treated alike; the promise of equal justice under
law is an important justification for our legal system. Variability is also
claimed to create instrumental defects . . . .” ; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at
908 “Determination of awards on an ad hoc and unpredictable basis,
especially for ‘non‐economic’ losses . . . tends to subvert the credibility of
awards and hinder the efficient operation of the tort law’s deterrence
function” ; see also The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 5‐8 citing relevant
cases and literature .
11.

See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of
Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV.
1109, 1118‐20 1995 .
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are applied inconsistently and with minimal standards;12 they are used to
address only the most extreme awards rather than variability generally;
and regular use of such methods, and the replacement of jury
determinations with the discretion of the court, would arguably raise
significant constitutional problems and would be inconsistent with norms
of tort law.13 Additionally, these methods serve as a band‐aid rather than
addressing the underlying problem—that juries receive insufficient
guidance for assessing awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages.14
Second, numerous jurisdictions have imposed damage caps to address
extreme awards. Legislatures have enacted damage caps for certain types
of awards, such as punitive damages, or for damage awards generally.15
However, damage caps address only extreme cases and only excessive
awards.16 Moreover, capping awards wholesale without regard for the
individual circumstances of a case gives rise to fairness and
proportionality concerns and can harm the deterrence objectives of tort
law and disincentivize beneficial lawsuits.17 It may cause constitutional
concerns as well.18
Third, a number of commentators have proposed using awards in
comparable cases as guidance for award determinations. These methods
12.

Jutzi‐Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 7th Cir. 2001 “ Most
courts treat the determination of how much damages for pain and suffering
to award as a standardless, unguided exercise of discretion by the trier of
fact, reviewable for abuse of discretion pursuant to no standard to guide the
reviewing court either.” .

13.

See Baldus et al., supra note 11, at 1118‐27; The Logic of CCG, supra note 3,
at 8‐9. But see CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 248‐
52 2002 arguing for a larger judicial role in determining punitive
damages .

14.

Note that The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, proposes the use of prior‐award
information in addition to the procedures of additur and remittitur—not in
place of them.

15.

See Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in
General Damages Generally Fall on Deaf Ears? and Why This Is Too Bad ,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 510 2006 .

16.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 9.

17.

See Sanders, supra note 15, at 509‐11; The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 9.

18.

Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An
Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 385, 387
2005 .
411
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have been proposed in various forms. Some have focused on the use of
comparable cases to develop a more principled approach to judicial review
of jury awards for excessiveness.19 Although these methods would
improve the standards underlying a court’s review, they suffer from many
of the same problems that apply to the additur and remittitur procedures.
For example, they address only extreme awards, and regular replacement
of the jury’s discretion with that of the court arguably gives rise to
constitutional concerns and is inconsistent with norms of tort law. Similar
issues arise from methods that involve binding the trier of fact to a
particular award or range of awards, or that predetermine a schedule of
awards in advance of a case. These methods have been criticized as
replacing the jury’s discretion with that of the court or a legislative body
altogether removed from the subject case.20
Some recommendations, however, involve “comparability analysis,”
whereby a court identifies comparable cases, provides the trier of fact with
information regarding the awards in these cases, and instructs the trier of
fact to arrive at a damages award based on the evidence, using the
comparable‐case information as guidance.21 These recommendations are
based on studies demonstrating that they are effective methods of
controlling outlying awards and variability generally, even when the
information is provided as non‐binding guidance.22

B. Prior‐Award Information
In this paper, we focus on the specific type of comparability analysis
called “comparable‐case guidance” CCG or “prior‐award information,”
described in The Logic of CCG as information derived from prior
19.

See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 11.

20.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 10; see Logan, supra note 6, at 942‐43
“Such an approach would streamline litigation and greatly limit, if not
eliminate, the concerns with variability and fairness that the current practice
risks by treating like cases differently. However, this approach is fatally
flawed because it eviscerates the various contributions that juries make to
the civil justice system. Moreover, this approach is fundamentally
inconsistent with the basic tort principle that each victim is entitled to an
award tailored to his or her circumstances, set by a lay jury.” citing
RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a AM. LAW INST. 1979 .

21.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 3.

22.

See Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 243, 249‐55 1997 .
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“comparable” cases considered by the trier of fact as guidance as opposed
to a binding range for determining damage awards.23
Numerous courts and commentators have called for the use of prior‐
award information in some form or other to guide jury determinations.
Consider, for example, the case Jutzi‐Johnson v. United States, which
involved an appeal from an award for pain and suffering resulting from a
bench trial.24 In that case, Judge Richard Posner commented on the “acute”
problem of “figuring out how to value pain and suffering.”25 According to
Judge Posner, notwithstanding “ v arious solutions, none wholly
satisfactory, that have been suggested,” “ m ost courts do not follow any
of these approaches. Instead, they treat the determination of how much
damages for pain and suffering to award as a standardless, unguided
exercise of discretion by the trier of fact, reviewable for abuse of discretion
pursuant to no standard to guide the reviewing court either.”26 He
concluded that “ t o minimize the arbitrary variance in awards bound to
result from such a throw‐up‐the‐hands approach, the trier of fact should,
as is done routinely in England . . . be informed of the amounts of pain and
suffering damages awarded in similar cases.”27 He continued: “And when
the trier of fact is a judge, he should be required as part of his Rule 52 a
obligation to set forth in his opinion the damages awards that he
considered comparable,” noting that courts “make such comparisons
routinely in reviewing pain and suffering awards,” and remarking that “ i t
would be a wise practice to follow at the trial level as well.”28

23.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 4.

24.

263 F.3d 753 7th Cir. 2001 .

25.

Id. at 758.

26.

Id. at 758‐59.

27.

Id. at 759 citations omitted .

28.

Id. citations omitted ; see also Roselle Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About
General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 751, 816‐17 1999 discussing “reforms consistent with the available
data” and suggesting that “ a nother powerful yet modest reform would be
to pool jury awards made for similar injuries, and to present these cases and
their award distributions to juries for guidance in reaching their general
damages awards and to judges for conducting their additur/remittitur
reviews” ; Chase, supra note 4, at 775, 777‐90 discussing recommendation
by the ABA Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System to
establish “‘tort award commissions’ . . . to gather and report information that
would be useful in ‘the framing of jury instructions, the exercise of the power
of additur and remittitur, and the process of settling cases,’” and proposing
413
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However, calls for such methods have generally failed, in part due to
objections based on their reliance on a court’s ability to identify an
appropriate set of “comparable” cases.29 First, some authors have
questioned whether prior‐award information can increase predictability,
notwithstanding the unpredictability of the prior awards themselves.30
Second, and most prominently, commentators have argued that, even
assuming that prior‐award information reduces unpredictability, its
reliance on awards arising from distinct cases introduces the possibility of
biasing the award, or distorting the size of the award. The fundamental
issue is therefore not simply whether prior‐award information reduces
variability. It is whether it reduces variability relative to any introduction
of bias.31
Therefore, we address these objections by examining the effect of
prior‐award information on “error”—or, inversely, “accuracy”—which we
define in terms of both variability and bias.32 Conceptually, accuracy can
be understood as reflecting the idea that a damages award can be “better”
or “worse” based on societal objectives and norms.33 For purposes of this
paper, we use the term in a specific way: we improve the accuracy of an
award if we reduce the unpredictability of the award without introducing
“too much” bias. In Part III, we provide formal definitions of accuracy,
error, variability, and bias within the context of our experiment, and we

method involving charts providing nonbinding guidance “to allow
comparison with roughly similar cases in which plaintiffs’ verdicts were
recovered” quoting Report of the Action Commission to Improve the Tort
Liability System, AM. BAR ASSOC. 10‐15 1987 ; Logan, supra note 6, at 939‐
44 discussing proposals ; Sanders, supra note 15, at 496‐507 discussing
proposals and studies .
29.

See The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 4‐5.

30.

See Geistfeld, supra note 7, at 792; Peter H. Schuck, Scheduled Damages and
Insurance Contracts for Future Services: A Comment on Blumstein, Bovbjerg,
and Sloan, 8 YALE J. REG. 213, 218 1991 “ B y using earlier awards as the
foundation for their new system of damages scheduling, they impound and
then compound what they themselves characterize as the distortions of the
past, thereby projecting those distortions into the future.” ; The Logic of
CCG, supra note 3, at 4‐5.

31.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 5.

32.

Id. at 13.

33.

Courts arguably recognize this when, for example, they use tools such as
additur and remittitur.
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explain how much bias is “too much,” so as to reduce accuracy. Here,
however, let us examine these notions in further detail conceptually.
Previous literature has modeled a damages award as an estimation
problem in which an actual award serves as an estimate of a “correct”
award that would reflect complete information regarding the law and the
facts of a claim. In this approach, the error associated with the estimate
represents the distance between the actual award and the correct award.34
In turn, according to this model, error can be deconstructed into variance
and bias.35 Variance is a measure of dispersion around a mean, or an
“expected,” award value. Bias, meanwhile, is a measure of the difference
between the expected award and the correct award. “If the estimation
process is ‘unbiased,’ then it will generate the correct value on average. If
it is ‘biased,’ then it will generate the incorrect value on average, and the
‘bias’ reflects the distance between the value the the estimation process
generates on average and the correct value.”36 Unbiasedness is generally a
desirable feature of an estimation process, but it does not imply the
34.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 12 citing Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for
Accuracy: A Closer Look at Sampling and Accuracy in Class Action Litigation,
14 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 67, 74‐78 2015 hereinafter Aggregating for
Accuracy . Note that we can similarly define a distribution of “correct”
awards reflecting, for example, uncertainty regarding the law. See Hillel J.
Bavli, Sampling and Reliability in Class Action Litigation, 2016 CARD. L. REV.
DE NOVO 207, 209 n.16 2016 . The Logic of CCG follows previous literature
that characterizes a “correct” award as “the mean of the population of
possible awards that would emerge from adjudicating the case repeatedly
under various conditions e.g., before different judges and juries, by different
attorneys, with different permutations of facts, etc. .” The Logic of CCG,
supra note 3, at 13 citing Aggregating for Accuracy, supra note 34, at 74‐78;
Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 815, 833‐34 1992 . This characterization is intended to capture
various interpretations of the law, the facts of the case, norms, etc. The Logic
of CCG, supra note 3, at 13 n.51. There are in fact many reasonable
definitions for the “correct” award in a case. Even using the
conceptualization above, other measures of central tendency—such as the
median—may be used, depending on our beliefs regarding the best way to
characterize the “correct” award e.g., whether we want to capture
information regarding extreme values, etc. . We adopt this characterization;
but, as discussed, it is for convenience rather than necessity. See generally
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1986 .

35.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 12‐15.

36.

Id. at 14.
415
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absence of error: the process may produce highly dispersed values around
a correct value.37 For example:
I f the correct punitive damages value in a case . . . is $100,000,
then repetitions of an unbiased adjudication may generate
estimate values i.e., damage awards of $0, $50,000, $150,000,
and $200,000, which are indeed centered at the correct value of
$100,000; however, the awards are highly dispersed around
$100,000. We would, for example, prefer that repeated
adjudications generate the values $90,000, $95,000, $105,000, and
$110,000; or even better, $100,000, $100,000, $100,000, and
$100,000.38
Therefore, variance, a measure of such dispersion, is also a crucial
component of error.39 Indeed, some circumstances may involve a tradeoff
between bias and variance, where it is necessary to introduce the
possibility of some bias in order to achieve substantial reductions in
variance and, on balance, significant improvements in accuracy. For
example, if the correct award in a case is $100,000, it may be preferable to
have an estimation process that generates the values $90,000, $93,000,
$97,000, and $100,000 rather than $0, $50,000, $150,000, and $200,000,
even though the latter set is unbiased and therefore centered at the correct
award while the former set is biased and therefore centered at the
incorrect award. Specifically, the former set may be preferable because,
while it involves some bias, the bias is modest the mean of the four values
is $95,000—only $5,000 off from the correct award and the variance is
far less than that associated with the latter set of awards.
It has been argued that applying prior‐award information to improve
the accuracy of damage awards involves this type of tradeoff.40 Specifically,
it has been argued that “CCG improves the accuracy of awards for pain and
suffering and punitive damages—award types that suffer from particularly
high degrees of variability—by facilitating a balance between minimizing
variability and introducing the possibility of bias.”41 The Logic of CCG
examined this tradeoff theoretically. The purpose of the current article is
to test it experimentally.
37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 15‐24.

41.

Id. at 19.
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Thus, in terms of bias and variance, prior‐award information is
hypothesized to cause a reduction in variance by providing jurors with a
context to guide their decision, or some form of “anchor,”42 but at the
inherent cost of introducing the risk of bias by providing award
information from cases that are not identical to the subject case.43
Importantly, for purposes of this paper, it is unnecessary to assume
the existence of a correct award. We are concerned only with whether
prior‐award information improves or harms the accuracy of an award
relative to what the award would be in the absence of prior‐award
information. In this sense, rather than requiring a correct award, our
argument relies on two assumptions: that reducing the variability of an
award is good i.e., improves the accuracy of an award and introducing
bias is bad i.e., harms the accuracy of an award . Defining a correct award
is useful for purposes of simplifying terminology, and to remain consistent
with terminology in previous literature. Further, our definition of a correct
award promotes a conservative analysis. Specifically, as in previous
literature, we define the correct award associated with a claim as the
average of repeated adjudications of a claim without prior‐award
information.44 For example, we assume that if a court had unlimited
resources, it would prefer to adjudicate a claim numerous times before
numerous juries, etc. and use the average adjudication as the ultimate
damages award. This allows for the foregoing assumptions—that reducing
variance is good and introducing bias is bad—by assuming that the award‐
generating process is initially unbiased. Again, this assumption of
unbiasedness is not necessary for our results; indeed, it is unlikely that
damage awards are entirely unbiased. Rather, we include this assumption
for purposes of convenience and to promote conservative estimates by
ensuring that any bias introduced by prior‐award information counts as
“bad” in the sense of reducing accuracy in actuality, if an award is in fact
biased, introducing bias through prior‐award information could improve
accuracy by negating the preexisting bias .
Earlier articles have used statistical theory and modeling
assumptions—in particular, the optimal use of prior‐award information,
given the variability of the prior awards and the random variation of the
subject award—to argue that prior‐award information would improve the
accuracy of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages under a
42.

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128‐30 1974 .

43.

The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 17‐19.

44.

Id. at 12‐15
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robust set of conditions regarding the actual comparability of the cases
underlying the prior awards relative to the subject case. These
“comparability” conditions are defined in terms of both the “misalignment”
of the prior cases with the present case—i.e., the difference between the
mean of the correct awards in the prior cases and the correct award in the
subject case—and the substantive or factual variability of the prior
cases, reflected in the variance of the prior awards.45 The Logic of CCG
discussed methods for identifying comparable cases and extracting
comparable‐case information for consideration by a jury. This process
does not require a reinvention of the wheel: courts have used
comparability analyses in various contexts and these contexts provide
good guidance for developing comparable‐case information to guide juries
in their determinations of awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages.46 For example, courts have used comparability analysis for
purposes of additur and remittitur, on appeal in reviewing awards for
excessiveness, and in various substantive contexts, such as challenges to
compensation in the takings context.47
A detailed analysis of methods for developing comparable‐case
information is beyond the scope of this article. But as discussed in The
Logic of CCG, courts should be concerned with balancing three factors
when developing such information: “the factual alignment of the prior
cases with the subject case, the factual breadth of the prior cases, and the
number of prior cases.”48 As courts have done in other contexts, a court
might provide guidance to litigation parties for identifying comparable
cases and then “select a final set of cases from a pool identified by the
litigants and the court.”49 Further, courts can implicitly involve jurors in
the selection process by including fact summaries of the selected prior
cases in the presentation of comparable‐case information.50 Of course,
methods for identifying prior cases and distilling information for

45.

See id. at 15‐24; Hillel J. Bavli & Yang Chen, Shrinkage Estimation in the
Adjudication of Civil Damage Claims, 13 REV. L. & ECON. 2017 , http://doi.
org/10.1515/rle‐2015‐0010.

46.

See The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at 24‐28.

47.

Id. at 28‐31.

48.

Id. at 24.

49.

Id. at 26.

50.

Id.
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presentation to a jury must be balanced against accompanying litigation
costs.51
Ultimately, these earlier articles on comparable‐case guidance have
concluded that the accuracy benefits of prior‐award information are not
very sensitive to a court’s ability to identify a set of comparable cases.
They conclude that, absent very substantial error in selecting prior cases,
any introduction of bias caused by prior‐award information would be
minimal relative to the beneficial reduction in the random variation of
awards, and that, given a reasonable method for identifying prior cases,
providing jurors with prior‐award information would improve the
accuracy of award determinations.52
Thus, our aim in this paper is to test whether these effects hold
empirically, and whether they result from the mechanisms described in
the foregoing models. Our study differs from previous studies in that we
aim particularly to address the primary objections to these methods in the
literature by focusing explicitly on the effects of prior‐award information
on the accuracy of awards under a range of conditions related to the
selection of prior awards.53 In the following part, we explain our
framework for analyzing the effects of prior‐award information on
variability and bias and for analyzing these effects together and relative to
each other under varied conditions.

51.

Id. at 26‐28.

52.

See id. at 12‐24; Bavli & Chen, supra note 45, at 17‐24.

53.

There have been numerous studies examining the unpredictability of award
determinations and methods of addressing it. See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra
note 11; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8; Diamond et al., supra note 8; Leebron,
supra note 8; Saks et al., supra note 22; Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended
Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391
2005 ; see also Chase, supra note 4; Sanders, supra note 15, at 496‐507
summarizing proposals and studies . The experiment by Professor Saks et
al., supra note 22, is most closely related to the current study. That study
investigated the effects of prior awards in various forms, as well as a “cap
condition,” on the amounts awarded for pain and suffering in personal injury
cases—and specifically, with respect to award variability and “distortions” in
the amounts awarded. See id. at 246‐47. The authors found that “interval,”
“average‐plus‐interval,” and “examples” conditions—involving prior awards
that, in the terms of the current paper, were “aligned” with the subject cases
based on pilot studies—caused a reduction in variability while distorting
award amounts minimally or not at all. See id. at 246. They also found that
the “cap” condition performed poorly and sometimes increased the
variability and size of awards. See id. at 253.
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III. METHODOLOGY
To test the effects of prior‐award information on the spread,
magnitude, and accuracy of awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages we conducted a randomized controlled trial RCT using a
factorial design and the potential‐outcomes framework.54 Specifically, we
exposed each participant to a “treatment combination” or “treatment
condition” arising from a set of “factors” reflecting the prior‐award
conditions of interest. In each treatment condition, we set each of these
factors to a certain value, or “level.”55 We then drew causal conclusions
based on inferences about what an outcome would be under exposure to
alternative treatment conditions.56 In this part, we describe our
methodology, including the details of our experimental design and our
analysis.

A. RCT Setup and Administration
The study involved two legs, a primary leg Leg I and a secondary leg
Leg II . These should be understood as two separate RCTs. Parts III and IV
of this article refer to Leg I unless stated otherwise. We administered Leg
II specifically to address questions that arose from Leg I; accordingly, we
refer to those results as related questions arise.
We used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to recruit and administer the
experiment to approximately 5,500 participants in Leg I and 2,500
participants in Leg II. We restricted participation to U.S. citizens who were
eighteen or older and English‐speaking, the baseline eligibility
requirements for serving on a U.S. jury.57 Participants enrolled in the

54.

See Tirthankar Dasgupta, Natesh S. Pillai, & Donald B. Rubin, Causal
Inference from 2K Factorial Designs by Using Potential Outcomes, 77 J. ROYAL
STAT. SOC. SERIES B STAT. METHODOLOGY 727, 727 2015 hereinafter 2K
Factorial Designs ; Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments
in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688 1974 .
We use the notation and general framework established in 2K Factorial
Designs but extend the notation to accommodate the additional levels
present in this experiment.

55.

See generally 2K Factorial Designs, supra note 54.

56.

See generally Rubin, supra note 54, at 689‐90; C. F. JEFF WU & MICHAEL S.
HAMADA, EXPERIMENTS: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIMIZATION 2d ed. 2009 .

57.

Mechanical Turk requires that all participants be eighteen or older and
English‐speaking. We attempted to enforce the U.S. citizenship requirement
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experiment sequentially and were randomly assigned to receive one of
twenty‐two treatment conditions, which determined what prior‐award
information, if any, a participant received as guidance for her response.58
For each treatment condition, participants were provided a fact pattern
and jury instructions that included guidance, specific to the assigned
treatment condition, for determining a damages award. Participants were
then asked to determine a damages award, provide an optional
explanation, and provide certain demographic information.59
Each treatment condition contained one of two fact patterns.
Conditions with a punitive damages fact pattern contained the following
paragraph:
You are a juror in a trial in which a car manufacturer concealed its
knowledge of a defect in its car’s airbag system. As a result of the
defect, the airbags would fail to deploy in a small proportion of
frontal collisions. The lawsuit was brought by a driver, Andrew,
who suffered severe brain injury from a frontal collision caused by
ice on the road. He now lives with headaches, blurred vision,
speech impairment, and memory loss. At trial, it was established
that, as a result of the defect, the airbags failed to deploy. It was
also established that, had the airbags deployed properly, Andrew’s
injuries would have been avoided.

by requiring that all participants have an IP address located within the
United States. Additionally, we asked that potential participants refrain from
participating if they failed to meet the requirements.
58.

We used a “dynamic randomization scheme” to ensure roughly equal sample
sizes across treatment groups. This scheme maintains the properties of
classical randomization, assuming the participants enroll randomly in the
sense that one individual’s enrollment does not affect another’s subsequent
enrollment other than through the restriction on the number of units in each
treatment condition.

59.

Participants received $0.20 to $0.30 for their participation in the survey.
Participants were also given the opportunity to provide feedback regarding
the survey. We used two measures to confirm that participants were
attentive rather than completing the survey arbitrarily. First, we examined
the amount of time that participants took to complete the survey, which
comported with our expectations; and we examined the proportion of
participants who provided optional explanations, which was high—about
75‐80%. While we used explanations as a signal for attentiveness, we did not
interpret the absence of an explanation as a signal of inattentiveness.
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Conditions with a pain and suffering fact pattern contained a different
paragraph:
You are a juror in a trial in which a company intentionally
disposed of its industrial waste by regularly dumping it into a local
river rather than having the expense of disposing it properly. The
lawsuit was brought by Emma, a 29‐year‐old woman whose
drinking water was affected by the improper disposal and who
developed a rare cancer as a result. Three years before her
diagnosis, Emma married her college boyfriend. She and her
husband now have a two‐year‐old daughter. Emma has undergone
multiple surgeries and months of chemotherapy and radiation
therapy, but doctors have recently informed her that the cancer
has spread and that her likelihood of survival beyond six months is
very low. Since her diagnosis one year ago, she has suffered from
regular pain, nausea, fatigue, and disfigurement, and her organs
have recently begun to fail.
All conditions also included a paragraph‐long jury instruction based on
real‐world instructions for determining punitive damages60 or a damages

60.

For the punitive damages scenario, stimuli included the following paragraph:
The judge has asked you to determine a “punitive damages” award.
He informs you that, through a separate proceeding, Andrew has
already been compensated for his injuries, including his medical
expenses and his pain and suffering. The judge instructs you that
your role now is to determine a “punitive damages” award. He
explains that “punitive damages are damages awarded not to
compensate the plaintiff for any injury but to punish the defendant
for outrageous conduct and to deter the defendant and others from
similar conduct in the future. You are not required to award punitive
damages, and you may award such damages only if you find that the
defendant’s conduct was in fact outrageous.” The judge emphasizes
that “there is no exact standard for determining punitive damages.
You should decide on an amount that you find necessary for
achieving the objectives described above. You should consider the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct and the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff.”

See JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, 1 PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW
PRACTICE 2d § 11:8 2018 ed.
for the survey .
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award for pain and suffering.61 For the control arms of the experiment, the
description ended and participants were asked to determine an award for
punitive damages or pain and suffering depending on the participant’s
assigned fact pattern . Participants assigned to one of twenty active
treatment conditions, however, were additionally provided certain
information regarding awards in prior “comparable” cases. For example,
they may have been provided with a paragraph similar to the following:
Additionally, the judge informs you that in five previous similar
cases juries have determined awards for punitive damages or
pain and suffering in the amounts of $____________, $____________,
$____________, $____________, and $____________ . The judge indicates
that this information regarding prior awards is intended as
guidance only, and that you may use or not use the information
as you see appropriate.
The form and substance of the numerical prior‐award values were
based on the treatment condition to which a participant was randomly
assigned—and particularly, based on the levels of scenario, bias,
variability, and form associated with that treatment condition. These
values are discussed in the following subsection.

61.

For the pain and suffering scenario, stimuli included the following
paragraph:
The judge has asked you to determine a suitable damages award for
Emma’s pain and suffering past and future and her loss of capacity
for enjoyment of life. He informs you that, through a separate
proceeding, Emma has already been compensated for her monetary
costs, such as past and future medical expenses. The judge instructs
you that your role now is to determine an award for Emma’s
physical and mental pain and suffering past and future and her
loss of capacity for enjoyment of life. The judge emphasizes that “no
evidence of the value of intangible things, such as mental or physical
pain and suffering, has been or need be introduced. You are not
trying to determine value, but an amount that will fairly compensate
the plaintiff for the damages she has suffered. There is no exact
standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these
elements of damage.” You should use your judgment to decide a fair
amount.

See PATTERN CIV. JURY INSTR. 5TH CIR. § 15.3 COMMITTEE

ON

INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, FIFTH CIRCUIT 2014
pattern jury instructions adapted for the survey .

PATTERN JURY
containing
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B. Treatment Conditions
As discussed, the two control conditions involved no prior‐award
information and involved either a punitive damages scenario or a pain and
suffering scenario.62 Each of the twenty active treatment conditions
involved a combination of four experimental factors: scenario two levels ,
form three levels , bias two levels , and variability two levels , where
scenario was set to either punitive damages or pain and suffering, form
was set to either average, list, or range, bias was set to either unbiased or
biased, and variability was set to either low variability or high variability.
Therefore, each treatment condition is characterized by the level to which
each factor is set, and the treatment condition to which a participant was
randomly assigned determined the particular stimulus he or she received.
For example, a participant assigned to the treatment condition that
involves scenario pain and suffering, form list, bias unbiased, and
variability
high variability received a stimulus that asked the
participant to determine an award for pain and suffering, and provided
unbiased high‐variability prior‐award information in the form of a list.63
To determine the numerical values that would define each active
treatment condition, we conducted a pilot study n 400 that
substantively replicated the control conditions of the main study, and we
used the distributions of the award determinations in the pilot study as a
reference for defining levels of bias and variability. For each level of
scenario, we used the median of award amounts in the corresponding pilot
sample as the unbiased average64 and the 30th percentile of award
62.

For purposes of the factorial design, the control conditions can together be
viewed as a separate factorial experiment.

63.

By design, certain levels of certain factors are incompatible with certain
levels of other factors. In particular, the variability factor is not applicable
when prior‐award information is presented in the average form. Also, as
previously stated, for control conditions, only the scenario factor is
applicable.

64.

Implicit in our terminology is the existence of a correct award for each
scenario. See supra Section II.B. We defined the correct award consistently
with previous literature, as the mean of the distribution of awards that
would result from infinitely repeated adjudications of the control
condition under various conditions. See The Logic of CCG, supra note 3, at
12‐13; supra note 34. For a number of reasons, however, the median is likely
to serve as a better estimator than the mean. For example, the mean would
be too heavily influenced by a few extreme outliers in the relatively small
control samples relative to infinitely repeated adjudications . Also, extreme
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amounts as the biased average.65 Additionally, for each level of scenario,
we used the 15th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 85th percentiles of award amounts
in the corresponding pilot sample as the unbiased high‐variability list, and
the 40th, 45th, 50th, 55th, and 60th percentiles as the unbiased low‐
variability list. Finally, for each level of scenario, we used the 15th and
85th percentiles of the award amounts from the corresponding pilot
sample as the unbiased high‐variability range, and the 40th and 60th
percentiles as the unbiased low‐variability range.
To define high‐variability and low‐variability prior‐award information
in the biased treatment conditions, we calculated a “bias ratio” as the ratio
of the 30th percentile to the median within each level of scenario, and then
multiplied the values determined for the unbiased treatment conditions by
the corresponding bias ratio. Table A lists the prior‐award values that we
provided to participants in the main study in each active treatment
condition.
outliers are far less likely in real‐world trials involving actual juries and
presided over by judges. See infra Part V. In any event, our conclusions
would not be weakened were we to analyze the effects of interest with
reference to the results in the control condition directly, without reference
to a correct award. For example, without taking a position on how to
characterize a correct award, we could investigate the effect of a particular
treatment condition on magnitude, relative to the magnitude of the award in
the control condition. After all, prior‐award information is intended to
improve accuracy by reducing error from dispersion substantially more than
it adds error from distortion—whatever the initial “distortion” may be. As
discussed supra Section II.B, by referencing a correct award, we simply
assume that the award determination is initially undistorted, or unbiased;
and we assume that any distortion of award size is harmful. To be sure, if the
initial bias were sufficiently extreme, we may, under certain conditions, not
want to reduce variability around the central award. But such a problem
would require extreme initial bias, and there is no reason to assume that
such a bias exists even if, for our purposes, there were cause to assume
some source of bias in the first place . Furthermore, such an assumption may
be inconsistent with the position of the courts that reducing random
variation, without more e.g., without causing bias , is beneficial. In any
event, for purposes of clarity and consistency with previous literature, and to
highlight the assumption that any introduction of bias is harmful to accuracy,
we defined the correct awards as above, and estimated them using the
medians of the control group awards.
65.

We defined “biased” conditions using the 30th percentile to reflect very
substantial, but not entirely unrealistic, court “error” in determining a set of
prior awards. In Leg II, we used an alternative definition. See infra Section
III.E.
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Table A. Prior‐Award Information Provided in Active Treatment
Conditions
Scenario

Bias and
Variability
Unbiased Low
Variability

Pain and
Suffering

Unbiased
High
Variability
Biased Low
Variability
Biased High
Variability
Unbiased Low
Variability

Punitive
Damages

Unbiased
High
Variability
Biased Low
Variability
Biased High
Variability

Form

Prior‐Award Information66

Average
Range
List
Average
Range
List
Average
Range
List
Average
Range
List
Average
Range
List
Average
Range
List
Average
Range
List
Average
Range
List

$2m
$1.12m to $4.7m
$1.12m, $2m, $2m, $3m, $4.7m
$2m
$200k to $15m
$200k, $500k, $2m, $10m, $15m
$1m
$560k to $2.35m
$560k, $1m, $1m, $1.5m, $2.35m
$1m
$100k to $7.5m
$100k, $250k, $1m, $5m, $7.5m
$1m
$500k to $1m
$500k, $500k, $1m, $1m, $1m
$ 1m
$10k to $10m
$10k, $52.5k, $1m, $5m, $10m
$100k
$50k to $100k
$50k, $50k, $100k, $100k, $100k
$100k
$1k to $1m
$1k, $5.25k, $100k, $500k, $1m

C. Assessing and Correcting Covariate Balance
We collected data on nine covariates—age, sex, ethnicity, education,
employment status, marital status, household income, residential
community type, and political affiliation—upon receiving each
participant’s award determination and optional explanation. We used
these data, as well as metadata regarding participant enrollment times, to
test whether our randomization achieved reasonable covariate balance

66.
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We use “m” to denote millions and “k” to denote thousands.
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across treatment conditions.67 Substantial imbalances could prevent us
from knowing whether any observed effects are attributable to the
intervention or to the imbalance. Therefore, substantial imbalances should
be corrected prior to proceeding to the analysis phase of an experiment.68
To assess covariate balance across the twenty‐two treatment groups,
we used Pearson’s Chi‐squared test, which revealed no statistically
“significant” differences among the twenty‐two treatment groups.69 We
also performed pairwise comparisons to evaluate differences in frequency

 22 
  231 pairs of
 2 

distributions on each covariate for each of the 

distinct treatment groups using Fisher’s exact test and the “Benjamini‐
Hochberg procedure” to control the false discovery rate FDR to correct
for multiple comparisons.70 Again, we found no significant differences
between pairs of treatment groups on any of the eleven variables tested.
67.

We used metadata regarding participant enrollment times to construct
variables reflecting the time of day and day of the week of participant
enrollment to check for systematic differences in participants based on
enrollment times that may influence overall covariate balance and to
validate our assumption that participants enrolled in the study randomly.

68.

To avoid data “dredging” and ensure that covariate balance would be
corrected in an objective manner, we finalized procedures for assessing
covariate balance and for addressing any imbalances prior to accessing any
data, and we analyzed the covariate data in a so‐called secondary design
phase in which we removed all outcome data and considered only covariate
data.

69.

We followed the common practice of combining, where sensible,
neighboring levels of the covariate contingency table to ensure that there
were five or more expected observations in each cell of the table. See
generally William G. Cochran, The χ2 Test of Goodness of Fit, 23 ANNALS
MATHEMATICAL STAT. 315 1952 . For example, for age, we aggregated levels
for ages above sixty‐one to create one “Over 61” level; for ethnicity,
participants who marked “American Indian or Alaska Native” were
aggregated with participants marking the value, “Other.” Additionally, for the
covariate sex, we observed twenty participants who marked the response
“Other” averaging one or fewer observations per treatment group . Because
there was no clear way to recode these observations into either the “Male” or
“Female” levels, we excluded these participants from subsequent analyses.
We then performed post‐hoc analyses to evaluate any impact of excluding
them and concluded that there was no such impact.

70.

See Yoav Benjamini & Yosi Hochberg, Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A
Practical and Powerful Approach to Multiple Testing, 57 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC.
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In summary, our analysis of the covariate data indicated that, by the
observed randomization, we achieved suitable balance on all demographic
variables and enrollment‐time variables across the twenty‐two treatment
groups. Therefore, we proceeded to the analysis phase of the experiment
without applying any corrections or adjustments to improve balance.

D. Causal Inference for Factorial Effects
The analysis of data from factorial experiments often relies on a
generalized linear model framework i.e., analysis of variance ANOVA .
However, as discussed in 2K Factorial Designs, these approaches have
drawbacks that can impede the ability to make causal conclusions about
the experimental factors.71 We therefore based our analyses and
estimation of causal effects on the potential outcomes framework of Jerzy
Neyman,72 often referred to as the Rubin Causal Model RCM .73 We
followed the basic notation and philosophy of estimation in 2K Factorial
Designs, which developed a theoretical framework for causal inference
from factorial designs using the potential outcomes model.74
SERIES B STAT. METHODOLOGY 289 1995 . We also performed comparisons
across aggregations of treatment groups corresponding to sixty effects of
interest defined in our primary analysis and found suitable balance for each
aggregation.
71.

For example, one drawback of the linear model framework is the
requirement that the causal estimands be defined as parameters of the
probability distribution of the observed response. To the contrary, our
results do not rely on distributional assumptions. See 2K Factorial Designs,
supra note 54.

72.

See Jerzy Splawa‐Neyman, Próba uzasadnienia zastosowań rachunku
prawdopodobieństwa do doświadczeń polowych On the Application of
Probability Theory to Agricultural Experiments , 10 ROCZNIKI NAUK
ROLNICZYCH 1 1923 , translated in 5 STAT. SCI. 465 1990 .

73.

See Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945
1986 .

74.
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Under the RCM, each unit i.e., each participant in this experiment has
twenty‐two “potential outcomes,” one for each possible treatment
combination. For example, a participant may have awarded $4 million had
he been randomized to the punitive damages scenario of the control
condition, $2 million had he been randomized to the unbiased, low‐
variability, average, punitive damages treatment condition, and so on and so
forth for all twenty‐two possible treatment combinations. The RCM frames
causal inference as a missing‐data problem: because we can observe only
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Using this framework, we defined “estimands” quantities of interest
for effects on accuracy, spread, and magnitude as well as corresponding
“estimators” functions of the data that we used to estimate the quantities
of interest .75 We also applied secondary definitions to determine whether
an observed effect is robust to other reasonable definitions and to obtain a
more complete picture of the effects of interest.

one potential outcome for each unit—the one to which the unit was in fact
assigned—we do not know, and therefore must estimate, the values of the
unobserved potential outcomes to make causal conclusions. See generally 2K
Factorial Designs, supra note 54; Holland, supra note 73; Rubin, supra note
54.
75.

We sought to assess the finite‐population effects of prior‐award information
for different levels of bias, variability, and form on the accuracy, spread, and
magnitude of resulting award values, where accuracy is defined as the
proximity of the awards to the “correct” award in terms of both bias and
variance. These objectives motivated our choice of estimands. We used the
mean of the logarithm‐transformed data to define magnitude, the
interquartile range IQR i.e., the difference between the 75th percentile
and the 25th percentile , to define spread, and the mean squared error
equal to the sum of the variance and the squared bias relative to the
“correct” award to define error. An estimand for the effect of a certain
variable on spread, for example, can therefore be defined as the difference
between the IQR in terms of potential outcomes associated with one
comparison group and that of another comparison group—for example, the
IQR associated with the unbiased punitive damages group and that of the
biased punitive damages group. A corresponding estimator can then be
defined using the observed data. Using the factorial‐effect estimators we
estimated an effect by computing the values of accuracy, spread, and
magnitude for each of the treatment combinations involving the factor or
combination of factors of interest, and then separately averaging over each
of the treatment combinations with the same level of the factor or
combination of factors . For example, for the main effect of bias on
magnitude within the pain and suffering scenario, we: 1 calculated the
magnitude of award amounts separately for each of the ten treatment
combinations receiving either biased or unbiased prior award information in
the pain and suffering scenario using the mean of the logarithm‐transformed
values; 2 averaged the values from step 1 across the five treatment
combinations receiving biased information, and separately averaged the
values from step 1 across the five treatment combinations receiving
unbiased information; and 3 calculated the difference of the averages
obtained in step 2 . Also note that the estimands and estimators defined in
this subsection applied to main effects as well as all two‐way, three‐way, and
four‐way interaction effects.
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We were interested in testing the null hypothesis that the true
difference between comparison groups is zero. Once we calculated the
estimates of factorial effects using observed data, we sought to understand
the “statistical significance” of the estimated effects, which can be
interpreted as an indicator of how unlikely the observed differences
between treatment groups would be under certain hypothesized effects.76
To do this, we used the Fisherian approach77 and applied randomization
tests to evaluate “Fisher’s sharp null hypothesis” of “no unit‐level
treatment effects.” We applied this approach to approximate “Fisher exact
p‐values” for each hypothesis and to generate 95% “Fisher intervals” for
certain effects of interest.78 All p‐values were adjusted for multiple
comparisons using the Benjamini‐Hochberg procedure to control the

76.

Rubin, supra note 54.

77.

Note that the RCM allows such inference using the Neymanian perspective,
Fisherian perspective, or the Bayesian perspective. See Donald B. Rubin,
Bayesian Inference for Causal Effects: The Role of Randomization, 6 ANNALS
STAT. 34 1978 . Because the estimator for capturing, for example, the
spread of award values is not an unbiased estimator of its corresponding
estimand, and for other reasons, we decided not to use Neyman’s method.
One of the major advantages of the Fisherian approach to inference, as
opposed to a model‐based or Bayesian approach, is that it does not require
any assumptions about the underlying distribution of the data. Thus,
randomization tests can be constructed and applied for any test statistic,
regardless whether its distribution is known.

78.

Specifically, for each effect of interest, we assumed the “sharp null”
hypothesis of “no unit‐level treatment effect” to impute missing potential
outcomes for each participant. We then generated a sample of Nsim 250,000
possible randomizations of the N participants. See generally GUIDO W. IMBENS
& DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL INFERENCE FOR STATISTICS, SOCIAL, AND BIOMEDICAL
SCIENCES 2015 . For each of these 250,000 possible randomizations, we
recomputed the value of the test statistic under the hypothetical
randomization. The resulting distribution is referred to as the
“randomization distribution” of the test statistic. We approximated Fisher
exact p‐values for each hypothesis to compute statistical significance by
calculating the proportion of values in the randomization distribution that
were equal to or more extreme than the observed test statistic. For certain
effects, we generated 95% Fisher intervals by calculating a sequence of
unadjusted p‐values corresponding to a null hypothesis other than the
hypothesis of “zero treatment effect,” and then identified the hypothesized
values that result in p‐values equal to or larger than 0.05. For all estimates,
we assumed a constant additive treatment effect.
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FDR.79 After adjustment, we considered p‐values of less than α 0.05 to be
statistically significant. “Significance” suggests that there is substantial
evidence within the data against the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect.80

E. Leg II Experimental Design
The primary purpose of Leg II was to test certain questions that arose
from Leg I. First, Leg I tested the effects of prior‐award information that
involved a downward bias, but not prior‐award information that involved
an upward bias—where the median of the prior awards was substantially
above the median of the control group. Second, certain treatment arms in
Leg I involved prior‐award information that was heavily right‐skewed in
distribution, which may have introduced certain effects. Therefore, in Leg
II, we aimed to test 1 the effects of unbiased prior‐award information
when prior awards were approximately symmetric rather than right‐
skewed; and 2 the effects of upwardly biased prior‐award information
with minimal or no skew . We also sought to test the effects of prior‐
award information using alternative definitions of accuracy, spread, and
magnitude.
We generally applied the design of Leg I to Leg II,81 only altering the
numerical values provided to participants. Also, Leg II, which used only the
list form for prior‐award information, involved only ten treatment
conditions and a significantly reduced sample size. As in Leg I, we
determined the numerical values of prior awards using a pilot study that
substantively replicated the control groups. In Leg II, we constructed
approximately symmetric distributions around the medians observed in
79.

See Benjamini & Hochberg, supra note 70; Maria T. Kimel et al., The False
Discovery Rate for Multiple Testing in Factorial Experiments, 50
TECHNOMETRICS 32 2012 . Due to having a large number of tests, we divided
our tests into primary analyses and secondary analyses, and we applied
adjustments for multiple comparisons within each category and within each
level of scenario which we treated as separate studies for purposes of our
analysis .

80.

Note that, throughout the study, we made the “stable unit treatment value
assumption” SUTVA . This means 1 that the potential outcome of a unit
depends only on its own assignment, and not on the assignments of other
units, and 2 that there are no “hidden versions” of treatment. 2K Factorial
Designs, supra note 54, at 730. We believe this was justified.

81.

This includes procedures for assessing covariate balance, which our
randomization achieved.
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the pilot study $500,000 for punitive damages and $2 million for pain and
suffering ; and we multiplied the unbiased prior‐award values by
approximately three to arrive at biased prior‐award values. Table B
provides a list of the Leg II treatment conditions and corresponding prior‐
award information.
Table B. Prior‐Award Information Provided in Leg II Treatment
Conditions
Condition
1. Pain and suffering control
2. Pain and suffering LV unbiased
3. Pain and suffering HV unbiased
4. Pain and suffering LV biased
5. Pain and suffering HV biased
6. Punitive damages control
7. Punitive damages LV unbiased
8. Punitive damages HV unbiased
9. Punitive damages LV biased
10. Punitive damages HV biased

Prior‐Award Information
None
1.2m, 1.7m, 2m, 2.4m, 2.9m
120k, 1.2m, 2m, 2.8m, 3.9m
3.6m, 5.1m, 6m, 7.2m, 8.7m
360k, 3.6m, 6m, 8.4m, 11.7m
None
350k, 410k, 500k, 590k, 680k
10k, 210k, 500k, 720k, 1.1m
1.2m, 1.3m, 1.5m, 1.7m, 1.9m
30k, 630k, 1.5m, 2.2m, 3.2m

Importantly, in addition to the purposes stated above, Leg II was
intended to test certain limits of prior‐award information in improving the
accuracy of damage awards. We used, for example, relatively extreme
values in the biased conditions and smaller differences between the high‐
variability and low‐variability conditions. We also used a substantially
smaller sample size. Therefore, as we noted up front in our Leg II design,
any failure to observe the tested effects in Leg II does not negate or call
into question our observed effects in Leg I.
IV. RESULTS
Our analysis involved approximately 400 hypothesis tests in Leg I and
250 hypothesis tests in Leg II, with numerous tests informing a particular
effect.82 Our general approach to interpreting the data was as follows:
First, we examined the comparison that most directly informs an effect of
interest. Second, we examined other comparisons that inform the effect
less directly. Third, if we found support for the effect in both steps 1 and
82.
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Note that we followed strict procedures to ensure that we could not access
outcome data prior to completing the design phase of each leg of the
experiment, respectively.
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2 , we generally interpreted the data as strongly evidencing an effect. If
we found support for the effect in step 1 , but an absence of evidence for
the effect in step 2 , we generally interpreted the data as evidencing an
effect, unless there was a particular reason to believe otherwise. If we
found support for the effect in step 1 but evidence against it in step 2 ,
we examined the inconsistency that arose in step 2 . If our examination
revealed a straightforward explanation that defused the inconsistency, we
interpreted the data as evidencing an effect and sought to confirm the
effect in Leg II. If the examination failed to reveal a straightforward
explanation, we interpreted the data as not evidencing an effect, and we
examined the results for an alternative explanation.

A. The Data
There are approximately 240‐250 observations for each treatment
level.83 To address extreme outliers, we “winsorized” the data at the 99th
percentile for our primary analysis and analyzed the effects of prior‐award
information on outliers—defined as awards above the 99th percentile in
each scenario—separately. This means that any awards above the 99th
percentile—$50 million for punitive damages and $100 million for pain
and suffering—were recoded to the award value of the 99th percentile.84
We took this step because extreme outliers can cause misleading results

83.

Prior to analyzing the data, we applied an initial “data cleaning” procedure to
ensure data quality. First, to ensure the validity of responses e.g., that they
originated from registered Mechanical Turk users who met our inclusion
criteria , we excluded twenty‐three participants who entered incorrect
payment codes. Second, we excluded four participants who provided award
amounts that were deemed nonsensical by our software. Because only a very
small number of participants were excluded from the initial sample of 5,500
participants, and because there was no evidence suggesting any resulting
systematic distortion, we excluded these participants without applying
advanced missing data techniques. Additionally, as indicated in our
methodology discussion, supra Part III, participants who marked “Other” for
their sex were excluded due to our inability to sensibly merge that category
with one of the other categories of sex for purposes of testing for covariate
balance. After applying these exclusion criteria, our final Leg I sample size is
N 5,458.

84.

Similarly, in Leg II, we winsorized the data at the 99th percentile $50
million and $174.6 million for punitive damages and pain and suffering,
respectively .
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that are dominated by chance rather than true effects.85 Furthermore, to
ensure the robustness of our findings, we also tested them under
alternative winsorization thresholds. We report the corresponding results
below.
Thus, unless stated otherwise, the results we report below reflect
datasets winsorized at the 99th percentile. In certain instances, we report
results from alternative winsorization schemes for illustrative purposes or
to make a point regarding those data in particular, but we identify such
instances clearly. Summary statistics for data in Leg I and II are provided
in Tables C and D, respectively.

85.
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Winsorizing had minimal consequences for our results in the punitive
damages scenario since outliers in that scenario are less extreme in size and
effect but was important to prevent spurious results in the pain and
suffering scenario
although ultimately it was not dramatically
consequential for our conclusions . Note that our original design in Leg I did
not include a winsorization scheme due to our sensitivity to the importance
of outliers in this study, but due to a few extreme outliers, it became clear
that not using such a method would lead to spurious results. We therefore
decided to use the conservative method described in the text and examine
the effect of prior‐award information on outliers separately. Note that such
extreme awards and probably some that are far less extreme are unlikely
in practice, and would be subject to reduction by the courts using the device
of remittitur.
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Table C. Summary Statistics for Leg I Sample N
Statistic
Sample Size
Mean
millions
Median
millions
SD
millions
IQR
millions

5,458

Punitive
Damages
Raw
2751
$18.3

Punitive
Damages
Winsorized
2751
$2.3

Pain and
Suffering
Raw86
2704
$23.8

Pain and
Suffering
Winsorized
2707
$6.7

$0.5

$0.5

$3.0

$3.0

$397.3

$6.4

$396.0

$14.0

$0.9

$0.9

$3.5

$3.5

Table D. Summary Statistics for Leg II Sample N
Statistic
Sample Size
Mean
millions
Median
millions
SD
millions
IQR
millions

2,521

Punitive
Damages
Raw
1262
$13.1

Punitive
Damages
Winsorized
1262
$2.35

Pain and
Suffering
Raw
1259
$23.8

Pain and
Suffering
Winsorized
1259
$8.5

$1.0

$1.0

$4.0

$4.0

$286.6

$6.2

$255.2

$20.3

$1.4

$1.4

$6.4

$6.4

B. Effect on Accuracy
The data provide strong evidence that prior‐award information
reduces error and improves accuracy. In both levels of scenario, and
across all levels of bias and variability, and their interactions, prior‐award
information had a significant negative effect on error and significant
positive effect on accuracy, which we measured using mean squared error
86.

For descriptive purposes, we exclude from this summary of raw pain and
suffering data three extreme values that are greater than or equal to $100
billion.
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MSE , a combination of variance and bias. Figure 1 illustrates the
approximate randomization distributions and observed test statistics for
the hypothesis tests of “no treatment effect” in each scenario; Figures 2
and 3 summarize the effects on error the inverse of accuracy with 95%
Fisher intervals and levels of significance. Note that, throughout this Part,
we report unadjusted p‐values and use stars to indicate statistical
significance after correction for multiple comparisons.87

Figure 1‐ Randomization Distributions. Randomization distributions
for effect of treatment any prior‐award information versus control no
prior‐award information on accuracy for punitive damages left and pain
and suffering right . Red lines show observed test statistics.

87.
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*** denotes statistical significance at the α 0.001 level, ** denotes statistical
significance at the α 0.01 level, and * denotes statistical significance at the
α 0.05 level.
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Figure 2 – Effects on Error. Point and interval estimates for difference
in mean squared error MSE in trillions for each treatment condition for
punitive damages left and pain and suffering right vs. control $146
and $492, respectively . Stars indicate statistical significance after
correction for multiple comparisons of the difference in MSE between
each treatment condition and control.

Figure 3 – Effects on Error. Observed mean squared error MSE in
trillions for different treatment combinations for punitive damages left
and pain and suffering right . Dotted lines at $146 and $492 show MSE
for control groups, respectively, and stars indicate statistical significance
after correction for multiple comparisons of difference in MSE between
each treatment condition and control.
As discussed above, prior‐award information may introduce error in
the form of distortion, or bias, but also reduce error by reducing the
dispersion of awards. We discuss effects on spread and magnitude below.
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The results above show, however, that any distortionary effects on the size
of awards are dominated in terms of error by the beneficial effects on
dispersion. In particular, prior‐award information caused an improvement
in accuracy across all levels of bias, variability, and form—effects largely
observed at the .001 level and all but one at the .01 level . Furthermore,
we observed similar results under secondary winsorization schemes and
definitions of accuracy. For example, to confirm that our results held
without the influence of more‐extreme values, we examined four
important effects using data winsorized at the 90th percentile—i.e., $5
million for punitive damages and $10 million for pain and suffering. Using
these data, we again observed significant positive effects on accuracy, all at
the .001 level. Similarly, we observed positive effects on accuracy using
mean absolute error MAE rather than MSE to define accuracy. Our
results for these effects are summarized in Figures 4‐6.

Figure 4 ‐ Effects on Error When Winsorizing at the 90th Percentile.
Point estimates and 95% Fisher intervals for difference in mean squared
error MSE in trillions vs. control for unbiased low‐variability and ‐
biased low‐variability conditions for punitive damages left and pain and
suffering right when winsorizing at the 90th percentile in each scenario.
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Figure 5 ‐ Effects on Error When Winsorizing at the 90th Percentile.
Observed mean squared error MSE in trillions for unbiased low‐
variability and biased low‐variability conditions for punitive damages
left and pain and suffering right when winsorizing at the 90th
percentile in each scenario. Dotted lines show MSE for control groups, and
stars indicate statistical significance after correction for multiple
comparisons of difference in MSE between each treatment combination
and control.

Figure 6 ‐ Effects on Error When Using MAE and Winsorizing at the 90th
Percentile. Observed mean absolute error MAE in trillions for unbiased
low‐variability and biased low‐variability conditions for punitive damages
left and pain and suffering right when winsorizing at the 90th
percentile in each scenario. Dotted lines show MAE for control groups, and
stars indicate statistical significance after correction for multiple
comparisons of difference in MAE between each treatment combination
and control.
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We observed similar results in Leg II, with positive effects on accuracy
throughout all levels of scenario, bias, and variability, aside from two tests
that indicated positive but non‐significant effects on accuracy see Figure
7 . Additionally, aside from two benign exceptions, all tests using a 90th
percentile winsorization scheme or MAE for the definition of accuracy
resulted in significant positive effects on accuracy.88

Figure 7 – Leg II Effects on Error. Point and interval estimates for
difference in mean squared error MSE in trillions vs. control for each
treatment condition for punitive damages left and pain and suffering
right in Leg II.

88.
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Throughout this Part, aside from a few comments, we do not focus on the
effects of form on the various outcome variables. The most important finding
with respect to form is that our results are generally not sensitive to the
particular form of the prior‐award information, and specifically, to whether
we provided jurors with prior‐award information in the form of an average,
range, or list. Most significantly, we found that prior‐award information
improves accuracy regardless of the level of form. More broadly, we found
that form generally did not have a significant effect on the outcome variables
studied. This does not imply that prior‐award form necessarily would have
no significant impact on jury determinations. See generally supra note 53;
Saks et al., supra note 22. Rather, we simply did not detect a significant
impact in our study. It is possible, for example, that such effects were
rendered undetectable in our study by other sources of variability.
Nevertheless, our findings with respect to form arguably suggest that if the
development of one form of prior‐award information involves lower costs
than others, it could be cost‐effective to present prior‐award information to
a jury in this form, in light of the similar levels of effectiveness detected
across various forms. However, further research regarding prior‐award form
would be valuable, and necessary to draw a firm conclusion in this regard.
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C. Effect on Spread
The effects of prior‐award information on accuracy provide evidence
of the effects on the dispersion of awards as well. Specifically, because
accuracy is defined using MSE, which can be deconstructed into bias and
variance, and because prior‐award information can only add bias, and not
reduce it, we know that any improvement in accuracy is due to a reduction
in variance. However, we separately tested the effect of prior‐award
information on spread, which we defined using the IQR rather than
variance. Understanding the effect of prior‐award information on spread,
in addition to its effect on accuracy, permits a more nuanced
understanding of the data.
The IQR is, in a sense, less sensitive to differences in random variation.
For example, changing a value at the 95th percentile from $1 million to
$50 million would not affect spread. But spread provides specific
information—the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles—that
may be obscured in other measures of dispersion.
The data provide strong evidence that prior‐award information
reduces spread. In the punitive damages scenario, our comparison of all
active treatment conditions combined to the control condition indicated
that, overall, prior‐award information caused a significant reduction in
spread p 0.001*** . Furthermore, we found that both unbiased prior‐
award information and biased prior‐award information caused a reduction
in spread p 0.02* for unbiased and p 0.001*** for biased .89
In several tests, particularly in the pain and suffering scenario, we
detected a significant increase in spread. This result was not very
surprising, however, because the range of the prior awards—and
particularly the high‐variability prior awards—was frequently
substantially larger than the control group IQR.90 This caused spread to
89.

Note that the average level of form tended to have a greater downward
impact on spread relative to the other levels of form. This may be
interpreted as resulting from the participants’ perception that there is no
variability in the prior‐awards, since they were provided only a single
number. Alternatively, the participants could have interpreted the average
form as providing less information and therefore “deserving of” less
influence. Participants simply did not know whether the average reflected,
for example, five prior awards of identical values or five highly scattered
prior awards. On balance, they seemed to have “interpreted” implicitly the
information as reflecting awards of lower variability.

90.

There are two reasons for this: first, the percentiles chosen for determining
the range of values of unbiased high‐variability prior awards are the 15th
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remain unchanged i.e., without significant effect , and even to increase in
response to high‐variability prior‐award information, notwithstanding an
overall reduction in dispersion, as reflected in the effects of unbiased
prior‐award information on accuracy.91 Effects on spread, with Fisher
intervals and levels of significance, are summarized in Figure 8.

Figure 8 – Effects on Spread. Point estimates and 95% Fisher intervals
for difference in spread in millions vs. control for each treatment
condition for punitive damages left and pain and suffering right .

and 85th percentiles, substantially wider than the IQR’s 25th and 75th
percentiles; second, there was greater dispersion in the pilot study data than
in the control group data, caused by “choppiness” in the data or sampling
variation. In Leg II, we addressed this issue by testing the effect on spread
using narrower prior‐award distributions. See infra Figure 9.
91.
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For example, unbiased high‐variability and unbiased low‐variability prior
awards in the pain and suffering scenario ranged from $200,000 to $15
million and from $1.12 million to $4.7 million, respectively, compared to the
25th and 75th percentiles of the pain and suffering control group awards,
which were $50,000 and $5 million, respectively. This explanation is
corroborated by our results in the punitive damages scenario, where,
although spread decreased in response to unbiased and biased prior‐award
information separately and combined , and decreased in response to
unbiased low‐variability, biased low‐variability, and biased high‐variability
prior‐award information, it increased in response to unbiased high‐
variability prior‐award information. This makes sense, because, as with the
pain and suffering scenario, unbiased high‐variability prior awards ranged
from $10,000 to $10 million, a range far greater than the control group 25th
and 75th percentiles $100,000 and $3 million, respectively . Compare this
to the unbiased low‐variability prior awards, which ranged only from
$500,000 to $1 million, well within the range of control group 25th and 75th
percentiles. This interpretation is confirmed by our results in Leg II, which
used narrower prior‐award distributions and resulted in significant
reductions in spread across the board.
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To confirm our interpretation, we first tested effects on spread using
alternative winsorization thresholds and measures of dispersion.
Specifically, we tested the effects of unbiased prior‐award information on
the standard deviation of awards using data winsorized at the 90th
percentile. These tests provide substantial support for our interpretation
above. Specifically, in both levels of scenario, unbiased prior‐award
information reduced the standard deviation of awards p 0.001*** for
punitive damages and for pain and suffering . Further, in both levels of
scenario, unbiased low‐variability prior‐award information reduced the
standard deviation of awards p 0.001*** for punitive damages and for
pain and suffering , whereas unbiased high‐variability prior award
information had no significant effect due to the relatively high dispersion
of unbiased high‐variability prior awards.
Moreover, we tested and confirmed our interpretation using Leg II. In
Leg II, which involved substantially narrower distributions of prior
awards, across all levels of scenario, variability, and bias, prior‐award
information reduced spread almost always at the .001 level using our
standard definition of spread IQR and our standard winsorization
threshold 99th percentile .92 The Leg II effects on spread are illustrated in
Figure 9.

Figure 9 – Leg II Effects on Spread. Point estimates and 95% Fisher
intervals for difference in spread in millions vs. control for each

92.

In addition, we found these effects to be robust to alternative definitions and
winsorization schemes: aside from a very small number of tests resulting in
negative but non‐significant effects, defining spread using variance and
winsorizing at the 99th percentile or the 90th percentile resulted in
significant reductions in spread across all levels of scenario, variability, and
bias.
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treatment condition for punitive damages left and pain and suffering
right in Leg II.

D. Effect on Magnitude
The effect of prior‐award information on magnitude is less
straightforward than its effects on accuracy and spread. Using our
standard definition of magnitude, the mean of the log‐transformed data,
we found that unbiased prior‐award information generally caused a
positive effect on magnitude for all levels of scenario, variability, and form.
However, using the median to define magnitude, we found no effect, and
using the mean to define magnitude, we found no effect or a negative
effect.
We can explain these disparities by considering the differences among
the various measures. The mean of the log‐transformed data is a
commonly used measure for testing magnitude with right‐skewed data.
The reason that it is popular for right‐skewed data is that it “pulls in”
extreme values more than it “pulls in” moderate values. On the other hand,
the median, which accounts only for differences in order, is not at all
affected by the skew; and the mean, which is sensitive to size, is heavily
influenced by extreme values. We can therefore understand the data as
follows: unbiased prior‐award information had no significant effect on the
size of awards, in the sense that the central award—the median—was not
affected. For example, in the punitive damages scenario, the median of
awards in the control condition is equal to the median of awards in
unbiased conditions, $1 million. This result supports the argument that
providing jurors with unbiased prior‐award information reduces the
dispersion of awards while distorting award size measured using the
median minimally or not at all. Furthermore, in line with our
expectations, unbiased prior‐award information had no effect or a
negative effect on award size when measured using the mean, thus
reflecting more extreme but non‐outlier awards when winsorizing at the
99th percentile or reflecting all outlier and non‐outlier awards when not
winsorizing .93 This interpretation was corroborated by our exploratory

93.
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Zero and negative effects are in line with our expectations when defining
magnitude using the mean. Because the distribution of award
determinations is heavily right‐skewed whether winsorizing at the 99th
percentile or not , we would expect that a reduction in dispersion including,
for example, a reduction in extreme values would also have a negative
impact on the mean award.
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analysis regarding outliers.94 Finally, however, unbiased prior‐award
information had a positive effect on award size when measured using the
mean of the log‐transformed data, thus reflecting the effects—but greatly
diminished effects through the log transformation —of more extreme but
non‐outlier awards. This positive effect results, in a sense, from weighting
non‐extreme values more heavily than more extreme but non‐outlier
values.
We confirmed our findings and interpretation using Leg II of the
experiment, where we observed similar effects—that is, positive effects or
no effects on magnitude using the mean of the log‐transformed data and
no effects or negative effects using the median or mean of the unlogged
data.95 We summarize the effects of unbiased prior‐award information on
magnitude based on winsorization at the 99th percentile unless stated
otherwise using various definitions in Table E below.
Table E. Effect of Unbiased Prior‐Award Information on Magnitude
Under Alternative Definitions96
Punitive Damages

Unbiased
vs
control
Leg II:
Unbiased
vs
control

Pain and Suffering
Log
mean

Median

Mean

Mean
winsor
90th

Log
mean

Median

Mean

Mean
winsor
90th

Positive

0

Negative

0

Positive

0

0

Positive

0

0

Negative

Negative

Positive

0

Negative

Negative

Based on our results in Table E, the effect of unbiased prior‐award
information on magnitude is highly sensitive to the measure used to define
it. In any event, although the data evidence no effect using various
common measures of central tendency, such as the median, the observed
effects on magnitude using the mean of the log‐transformed data may have

94.

See infra Section IV.F.

95.

Note that the prior awards in Leg II did not involve a substantial right skew,
which may have exacerbated any positive effects on magnitude observed in
Leg I.

96.

For comparative purposes, Leg II results in Table E are generally listed for
winsorization at the 99th percentile. It is important to note, however, that
using the mean of the log‐transformed data and winsorizing at the 95th
percentile a standard definition for magnitude in Leg II results in positive
effects for punitive damages and pain and suffering.
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implications. For example, it is not unlikely that the upper bound of a list of
prior awards has a positive anchoring effect on award determinations.97
Finally, in line with our expectations, biased prior‐award information
impacted the magnitude of awards, relative to the magnitude of awards in
unbiased conditions, in the direction of the bias. That is, for all levels of
scenario and variability, and in both Leg I and Leg II, downward bias had a
negative effect on magnitude and upward bias had a positive effect on
magnitude, relative to the magnitude observed in unbiased conditions.

E. Effect of Variability
We observed strong evidence that variability has significant influence
on the impact of prior‐award information. The data indicate that low‐
variability prior‐award information had a greater impact on spread and
magnitude—whether the impact was negative or positive—than did high‐
variability prior‐award information.
Pursuant to the model in The Logic of CCG, low‐variability prior‐award
information provides more information than high‐variability prior‐award
information98 and thus has greater influence on award determinations.
This “influence” translates to greater impacts on spread and magnitude.
Consistent with this model, for unbiased prior‐award information,
variability had no significant effect on magnitude since the prior‐award
information was unbiased but low‐variability prior‐award information
had a significantly greater impact negative impact on spread than did
high‐variability prior‐award information. That is, relative to unbiased
high‐variability prior‐award information, unbiased low‐variability prior‐
award information had no significant effect on magnitude and a significant
negative effect on spread p 0.001*** for punitive damages and for pain
and suffering . Moreover, biased low‐variability prior‐award information
had a significantly greater impact on both magnitude and spread than did
biased high‐variability prior‐award information. In other words, relative to
biased high‐variability prior‐award information, biased low‐variability
prior‐award information had a significant negative effect on both
magnitude p 0.001*** for punitive damages and for pain and suffering
and spread p 0.004** for punitive damages and p 0.001*** for pain and
suffering . Our results regarding the effects of low‐variability prior‐award
information relative to high‐variability prior‐award information are
summarized in Table F below.
97.

We discuss implications in Part VI.

98.

See supra Part II.

446

THE EFFECTS OF COMPARABLE-CASE GUIDANCE

Table F. Low‐Variability vs. High‐Variability Prior‐Award Information

Unbiased:
low
variability
vs high
variability
Biased:
low
variability
vs high
variability

Spread

Punitive Damages
Observed
p‐value
test statistic
‐$4,397,500 0.000***

Pain and Suffering
Observed
p‐value
test statistic
‐$8,000,000
0.000***

Magnitude

‐0.09

0.591

‐0.18

0.165

Spread

‐$727,500

0.004**

‐$4,112,500

0.000***

Magnitude

‐0.67

0.000***

‐0.52

0.000***

Note that a possible argument against this interpretation is that the
results observed can be explained by the effect of high variability on
spread rather than the effect of low variability on the influence of the
prior‐award information. Specifically, as suggested above, it is possible
that high‐variability prior‐award information had a positive effect on
spread, since the range of the high‐variability prior awards was greater
than the IQR of awards. Arguably, therefore, the observed effect here
results only from removing the upward effect on spread caused by this
high‐variability prior‐award information. There are, however, two
counterarguments. First, this argument cannot explain the effects of biased
low‐variability prior‐award information relative to biased high‐variability
prior‐award information, since neither of these conditions had a positive
effect on spread relative to the control condition. Furthermore, remember
that biased low‐variability prior‐award information did not involve prior
awards that were of lower amount than biased high‐variability prior‐
award information; rather, it had only lower variability. The biased low‐
variability prior‐award information ranging from $50,000 to $100,000
was completely contained within the range of values in the biased high‐
variability prior‐award information ranging from $1,000 to $1 million .
Thus, the significant negative effects of biased low‐variability relative to
biased high‐variability prior‐award information provide particularly
strong evidence that low‐variability prior‐award information had greater
influence—i.e., was more impactful—on award determinations than did
high‐variability prior‐award information.
Second, we confirmed our interpretation using Leg II. Specifically, Leg
II involved prior‐award distributions that were narrow and approximately
symmetric; and, although we did not have sufficient power as discussed
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above, due to relatively small differences among prior‐award distributions
and relatively small sample sizes 99 to detect many effects with respect to
variability, the data provide strong evidence in the punitive damages
scenario that low‐variability prior‐award information indeed had a
significantly greater negative impact on spread than did high‐variability
prior‐award information.

F. Effect on Outliers
In our exploratory analysis, we examined the effect of prior‐award
information on “outliers,” which we defined as awards at or above the 99th
percentile $50 million in the punitive damages scenario and $100 million
in the pain and suffering scenario . We found strong evidence that prior‐
award information had a significant negative effect on outliers.
In the control group of the punitive damages scenario, there were
thirteen observations out of 249 5.2% above $50 million, whereas in the
ten treatment arms of the punitive damages scenario, there were twenty‐
three observations out of 2502 0.9% above $50 million, or, on average,
approximately two observations 23/10 2.3 above $50 million per 249
observations. This represents a significant reduction in outliers
p 0.001** . Furthermore, in the five unbiased treatment arms in the
punitive damages scenario, there were fourteen observations out of 1257
1.1% above $50 million, or, on average, approximately three 14/5
2.8 above $50 million per 249 observations. This also represents a
significant reduction in outliers p 0.001*** .
In the control group of the dataset for the pain and suffering scenario,
there were ten observations out of 244 4.1% above $100 million,
whereas in the ten treatment arms of the pain and suffering scenario, there
were thirty‐three observations out of 2463 1.3% above $100 million, or,
on average, approximately three observations 33/10 3.3 above $100
million per 249 observations. This represents a significant reduction in
outliers p 0.002** . Furthermore, in the five unbiased treatment arms in
the pain and suffering scenario, there were nineteen observations out of
1229 1.6% above $100 million, or, on average, approximately four 19/5
3.8 above $100 million per 249 observations. This also represents a
significant reduction in outliers p 0.018* . Our analysis regarding the

99.
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effect of prior‐award information on outliers is summarized in Table G and
Figure 10.100
Table G. Effect on Outliers

Treatment
vs Control
Unbiased
vs Control

Punitive Damages Raw
Treatment Control
p‐value
rate
rate
0.9%
5.2%
0.000***
1.1%

5.2%

0.000***

Pain and Suffering Raw
Treatment Control p‐value
rate
rate
1.3%
4.1%
0.002**
1.6%

4.1%

0.018*

Figure 10 – Effect on Outliers. Percentage of outlier awards for
treatment and unbiased conditions for punitive damages left and pain
and suffering right . Dotted lines show percentage of outliers for control,
and stars indicate statistical significance after correction for multiple
comparisons of the difference in percentage of outliers between each
treatment combination and control.

100. Our Leg II results confirmed our findings in Leg I. In Leg II, we observed
significant negative effects on outliers for all tests in the punitive damages
scenario treatment vs. control, unbiased vs. control, and biased vs. control .
For the pain and suffering scenario, we observed significant negative effects
on outliers caused by biased prior‐award information, and reductions—
although non‐significant reductions—in outliers associated with unbiased
prior‐award information and overall prior‐award information. Note that
these latter two non‐significant results are due to unusually low power and
do not affect our other results regarding the impact of prior‐award
information on outliers. For example, were we to define an “outlier” as the
top 2% of awards which would allow for a larger sample of “outliers” ,
these tests would be significant as well p .001*** for treatment vs. control
and p 0.029* for unbiased vs. control .
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G. Effect on Explanations
In our exploratory analysis, we examined the effect of prior‐award
information on explanation response rates. As described in Part III, we
provided participants with the option of providing an explanation for the
amount they awarded. In total, 78.8% of participants who received the
punitive damages scenario and 76.2% of participants who received the
pain and suffering scenario provided explanations for their awards.
We found strong evidence that prior‐award information had a
significant positive effect on explanation response rates. Specifically, 78%
of participants who received prior‐award information provided
explanations, whereas only 72% of participants who did not receive prior‐
award information—those who were assigned to control groups—
provided explanations, representing a significant positive effect on the
overall explanation response rate p 0.0027** . Furthermore, we
observed a significant positive effect on the response rate in the pain and
suffering scenario p 0.004* and a positive but non‐significant effect on
the response rate in the punitive damages scenario p 0.083 .101
V. LIMITATIONS
Before discussing the implications of our results, we highlight a
number of important limitations. First, the experimental units in this study
were mock jurors rather than mock juries. Although juries are composed
of jurors, there is concern that deliberation among jurors would cause jury
awards to differ from juror awards, thereby limiting the applicability of
juror behavior to draw conclusions regarding jury behavior.
Numerous studies have shown that predeliberation juror preferences
or certain aggregations of juror preferences serve as good predictors of
jury awards.102 Nevertheless, there is a justified concern that the random
101. In Leg II, prior‐award information was associated with higher explanation
response rates, but due to substantially smaller sample sizes and, in some
instances, smaller increases , these effects were not significant at the 0.05
level.
102. See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 176‐77
2012 ; Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury
to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 513, 545‐46 1992 ; see also David Schkade et al., Deliberating
About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1147 n.37 2000
“We relied on evidence suggesting that the median judgment of a group of
predeliberative individuals is a good predictor of the judgment that group
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variation of awards is less for jury awards than for juror awards, thus
affecting how and under what circumstances our results regarding juror
behavior extend to jury behavior.103 In spite of this, due to the difficulty of
using juries as experimental units, it is very common to use jurors and
extrapolate findings to juries. Some authors have simulated jury awards in
juror studies by calculating the median award in random groupings of
juror awards.104 We refrained from using this approach for various
reasons—in general, because it can frequently lead to misleading results
and it relies on a range of questionable assumptions.105
Instead, in extending our conclusions regarding juror decision‐making
to draw conclusions regarding jury decision‐making, we rely on our use of
various winsorization schemes and various measures of accuracy, spread,
and magnitude. Specifically, we analyzed unwinsorized data, data
winsorized at the 99th percentile, and data winsorized at the 90th
percentile, each using various measures of accuracy, spread, and
magnitude, to gain a robust understanding of the effects of interest on
various aspects of award distributions—reflecting, for example, various
levels of award dispersion. In some ways, this approach has similar effects
to the so‐called “statistical jury” approach but with fewer negative
features.106
Furthermore, aside from studies showing that predeliberation juror
preferences or certain aggregations of such preferences are good
predictors of jury awards, there is a substantial body of literature showing
that jury deliberation does not solve the problem of unpredictability.107
will reach as a result of deliberation.” ; Diamond et al., supra note 8, at 315‐
17 discussing juror and jury damage awards .
103. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards
in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78
IOWA L. REV. 883, 897 1993 .
104. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law , 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2101 1998 ; John
Campbell et al., Countering the Plaintiff’s Anchor: Jury Simulations to
Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543, 556‐57 2016 ; Vidmar
& Rice, supra note 103, at 897.
105. See generally infra notes 109‐112 and accompanying text.
106. See generally Schkade et al., supra note 102, at 1171 comparing “the results
of jury deliberation and the results that would be produced by taking the
median of nondeliberating . . . groups” .
107. See Diamond et al., supra note 8, at 314‐17; Leebron, supra note 8, at 311‐
16; Schkade et al., supra note 102, at 1145‐46.
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For example, in a study by Diamond, Saks, and Landsman, “the variability
did not drop in absolute dollars for jury awards relative to juror awards
for both economic damages and damages for pain and suffering”; and “ a s
a percentage of mean award . . . jury variability was lower than juror
variability for both types of damage awards,” but dropped only “from 84%
to 78% for economic damages and from 179% to 146% for pain and
suffering awards,” leaving “substantial unexplained variability . . . across
juries.”108 Similarly, Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman found that
“deliberating juries produce more unpredictability than would be found by
taking the median of jurors’ predeliberation judgments,”109 and further,
that “27% of non‐zero jury dollar verdicts were as high as or higher than
that of the highest predeliberation dollar judgment of individuals.”110 Their
results led them to conclude that the process of deliberation relative to
grouping juror awards and taking the median “does not alleviate the
problem of erratic and unpredictable individual dollar awards, but in fact
exacerbates it.”111 “The safest and most cautious conclusion is that to the
extent that unpredictable punitive damage awards raise a serious concern,
the problem is not removed by deliberation.”112
Thus, in light of previous literature and the strong effects observed in
our study, as well as the robustness of our findings to various
winsorization schemes and measures of accuracy, spread, and magnitude,
it is likely that the effects we observed in this study of juror awards would
extend to jury awards as well. Nevertheless, “ c ollective judgments are
known to have less variability than individual liability awards,” and there
is a possibility of “exaggerated . . . effects of anchors”;113 in short, the
differences between juror effects and jury effects should be acknowledged
and accounted for when considering the implications of our results. We
studied juror behavior, and additional inference is required to draw
conclusions regarding jury behavior.

108. Diamond et al., supra note 8, at 316‐17.
109. Schkade et al., supra note 102, at 1172. The authors also concluded that
deliberation causes “dollar awards generally to increase, while making
high dollar awards substantially increase, in a general severity shift.” Id.
110. Id. at 1163.
111. Id. at 1139.
112. Id. at 1143.
113. Campbell et al., supra note 104, at 556; see Sanders, supra note 15, at 494‐96
discussing criticisms based on the disparity between juror‐based studies
and jury awards .
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Second, our study used mock jurors who decided an award following a
short summary describing one of two case scenarios rather than real‐
world jurors who decide an award following an actual trial. In a sense, this
study was a simplified “laboratory” experiment aimed at studying juror
behavior. A more ideal although far costlier experiment would involve
an intervention in real‐world jury trials. For example, the variability of
awards may be exaggerated because mock jurors may treat the situation
as hypothetical and ignore certain real consequences of extreme awards,
such as bankruptcies, job loss, etc.114 Note that extreme awards are
observed in the real world, but likely less frequently and perhaps less
dramatically than in laboratory experiments. Additionally, our summary
descriptions may have affected the variability of awards both in control
and active treatment conditions relative to real‐world trials that involve
multifaceted evidentiary support provided to substantiate arguments by
the plaintiff and the defendant, and that are presided over by a judge.
As above, however, it is likely that our analyses using various
winsorization schemes and various measures of accuracy, spread, and
magnitude help to mitigate these effects. Again, our use of winsorization
and various estimands allowed us to gain a robust understanding of the
effects of interest on various aspects of award distributions. Nevertheless,
these award distributions may differ from those that would result from
real‐world jury trials, which may give rise to unwanted effects.
Third, we used Mechanical Turk to administer the study. Although we
took steps to restrict our sample to individuals eligible to serve on a U.S.
jury, these steps were not necessarily 100% effective, and, perhaps more
importantly, our restricted MTurk population did not necessarily match up
perfectly with the adult U.S. population.
There have, however, been numerous studies analyzing the population
of MTurk workers. These studies have found that, although there are some
differences, the MTurk worker population is relatively representative of
the general population—and certainly more representative than
traditional pools for surveys and experimentation.115 Furthermore, we
114. On the other hand, it is possible that summary descriptions are less emotion‐
provoking than real‐world trials and therefore weigh in the opposite
direction.
115. See Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for
Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS
351, 366 2012 concluding that “relative to other convenience samples
often used in experimental research in political science, MTurk subjects are
often more representative of the general population . . . “ ; Connor Huff &
Dustin Tingley, “Who Are These People?” Evaluating the Demographic
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compared our sample in particular to the population of citizens eligible for
jury service and found only modest differences, further reassuring us that
our use of MTurk did not distort our results.116 Nevertheless, as numerous
authors have pointed out, the demographics of the MTurk population and
perhaps our sample may diverge from the general population in a
number of respects, including political views, education, and age.117
Although we believe that these differences are unlikely to have caused any
significant distortions, it is important to be aware of them and consider
their effects.

Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey Respondents,
2015 RES. & POL. 1, 8 2015 concluding that “respondents on MTurk are not
all that different from respondents on other survey platforms,” and that
“there are strong reasons for researchers to consider using MTurk to make
inferences about a number of broader populations of interest” ; Gabriele
Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 414 2010 “Our demographic data
suggests that Mechanical Turk workers are at least as representative of the
U.S. population as traditional subject pools, with gender, race, age and
education of Internet samples all matching the population more closely than
college undergraduate samples and internet samples in general.” ; see also
Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization,
125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1331 n.100 2016 addressing concerns regarding
MTurk subjects . Berinsky et al. also conclude that MTurk subjects “are
apparently . . . not currently an excessively overused pool, and habitual
responding appears to be a minor concern,” but caution that MTurk users
“are notably younger and more ideologically liberal than the public,” and
they “appear to pay more attention to tasks than do other respondents.”
Berinsky et al., supra note 115, at 366.
116. Specifically, we compared our Leg I demographic data to population data
from the 2010 U.S. Census and identified only two significant differences
between demographic averages from our sample and those from the Census.
See generally American FactFinder, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
factfinder.census.gov. In particular, regarding sex, 63% of participants in our
sample are female, compared to 58% based on the Census data, and
regarding age, 2% of participants in our sample are 65 or older, compared to
13% based on the Census data.
117. See John Campbell et al., Time Is Money: An Empirical Assessment of Non‐
Economic Damages Arguments, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 30 2017 addressing
concerns regarding MTurk subjects and noting that subjects are “slightly
more liberal, educated, young, and wealthy than the population as a whole” .
Note also that the jury‐eligible population may differ somewhat from the
actual jury population.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The “stark unpredictability” of awards for pain and suffering and
punitive damages is arguably unacceptable.118 We desire “predictability
and proportionality,”119 but, at the same time, require juries to determine
these awards through nothing more than a “standardless, unguided
exercise of discretion.”120 Awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages should be bound together, in the sense that like cases result in
like outcomes. But courts have been unwilling to bind such outcomes
together actively by using awards in comparable cases as guidance for
award determinations.
Recent literature has addressed, theoretically, the major objections to
using prior‐award information to guide award determinations, and has
argued that prior‐award information not only reduces the variability of
awards, but also improves accuracy, reflecting both bias and variance. The
instant study makes a number of important contributions. First, it
confirms empirically the hypotheses that prior‐award information
whether biased or unbiased substantially reduces the dispersion of
awards and that biased prior‐award information causes a distortion in the
size of awards in the direction of the bias. These results hold regardless of
whether prior‐award information is provided in the form of an average,
range, or list of prior awards. Additionally, the study suggests a potential
for distortion of award size from unbiased prior‐award information.
Defining award size in terms of a median—the most common measure
used in previous literature—we observed no significant distortion caused
by unbiased prior‐award information. But we observed such distortions
using other measures. The effect of unbiased prior‐award information on
award size is a question for future research.
Most importantly, our study shows that prior‐award information
causes substantial improvements in the accuracy of awards, and that such
improvements are robust to changes in scenario, as well as the bias,
variability, and form of prior awards. This means that any introduction of
error caused by distorting award size is dominated by the beneficial
effects of prior‐award information on the dispersion of awards.
Furthermore, these effects hold under various definitions of accuracy and
various winsorization schemes simulating, for example, mechanisms by
which real‐world awards are reduced or capped . Separately, there is
118. Exonn Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 2008 .
119. Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 94 2d Cir. 2013 .
120. Jutzi‐Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 7th Cir. 2001 .
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strong evidence that prior‐award information has the beneficial effect of
reducing the rate of outlier awards.
These findings provide strong evidence in support of proposals to
provide jurors with prior‐award information as guidance for determining
awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages. Specifically, they
provide evidence in support of the behavioral assumptions underlying
such proposals, and for the proposition that prior‐award information
would improve accuracy, even under a wide range of bias, variability, and
form conditions. As discussed in Part II, the primary objection to prior‐
award information is that its benefits rely on the actual comparability of
the prior cases to the subject case. But the instant study shows that this is
not so: prior‐award information improves accuracy even when the prior
cases are not comparable to the subject case and even when they entail
wide‐ranging facts and wide‐ranging awards, or, for that matter, narrow
facts and narrow awards, and regardless of whether the prior awards are
provided as an average, range, or list.121 This effect is not unconditional.
121. An in‐depth analysis of the relative disutilities of unpredictability, on the one
hand, and bias or award dependence, on the other hand, is beyond the scope
of this article. We note, however, that although there is good reason to be
highly resistant to certain types of bias—such as bias based on race or
gender—such resistance should arguably not apply to distortions of award
size generally, and distortions caused by prior‐award information in
particular. In the language of this article, we are concerned with the distance
between an actual award and a correct award, not whether the source of that
distance is bias or variance. Consider, for example, a hypothetical in which a
damages award will equal its correct award, say $5 million, on average i.e.,
the award is unbiased , but that it is highly variable around its correct
award, having a plausible range of $0 to $10 million. A procedure or
evidentiary rule that reduces the plausible range of the award to $5 million
to $6 million may be much preferred over the status quo, even if such a
procedure or rule causes some bias, for example, a new average award of
$5.5 million. Furthermore, prior‐award information may in fact reduce race‐
based and gender‐based bias, and other sources of bias to which courts
should be highly resistant, by increasing the relative influence of factors that
are relevant through a court’s selection of prior cases. Similarly, although
there is good reason to ensure that certain aspects of a claim’s adjudication
remain independent of influence from other claims, allowing the outcome of
a claim to be influenced by the outcome of another claim is not necessarily
contrary to current values, and it may in fact advance them. Claim
dependence facilitates the goal that like cases receive like outcomes, and that
“more extreme” claims receive “more extreme” awards, etc. It is also
noteworthy that, in many contexts, courts do indeed allow the outcomes of
claims to be influenced by the outcomes of other claims, notwithstanding the
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Some level of bias—for example, bias resulting from extreme non‐
comparability—would cause a reduction in accuracy. But the effects we
observed occurred under relatively extreme levels of bias and variability,
and under a range of winsorization schemes and measures of accuracy.
Given a reasonable method of selecting prior cases and providing award
information to jurors, prior‐award information is highly likely to improve
the accuracy of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages.
Furthermore, our results may have implications for alternative
methods of controlling award unpredictability, such as damage caps. As
highlighted in Part II, instituting damage caps is a highly controversial
method of controlling unpredictability that caps damage awards, or
certain types of damage awards, without consideration of the particular
facts of a case. Notwithstanding frequent criticism on fairness and
constitutional grounds, and the transfer of discretion away from jurors,
damage caps remain a primary method of controlling unpredictability.122
Our results provide support for the argument that crude and drastic cap‐
based methods are not necessary for controlling unpredictability—that
prior‐award information may constitute a more effective tool for achieving
goals of predictability, while maintaining juror discretion and case‐by‐case
adjudication.123
Finally, although our finding that prior‐award information caused an
increased likelihood that participants would provide an explanation for
their awards is subject to interpretation, one plausible possibility is that
prior‐award information provides context for an award, allowing for a
more thoughtful or analytical award determination. It is possible that
prior‐award information provides jurors with a framework in which to
make a reasoned, articulable determination, rather than one fitting of
Judge Posner’s description as standardless and unguided.124 The meaning
of these results is a fruitful topic for future analysis.
In summary, our research provides substantial support for the use of
prior‐award information, and specifically for the argument that prior‐
award information is an effective method of reducing the unpredictability
risk of introducing bias and inter‐claim dependence. Consider, for example,
courts’ use of additur and remittitur, comparability analysis in takings cases
and other civil contexts, and “proportionality review” and other forms of
sentence comparisons in the criminal context.
122. See supra Section II.A.
123. Our results may have implications for other legal contexts as well—for
example, criminal sentencing.
124. Jutzi‐Johnson, 263 F.3d at 759.
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of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages while preserving
the discretion of the trier of fact and improving the accuracy of awards
generally.
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